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Containing the spreading of crime in urban societies remains a major challenge. Empirical evidence suggests
that, left unchecked, crimes may be recurrent and proliferate. On the other hand, eradicating a culture of crime
may be difficult, especially under extreme social circumstances that impair the creation of a shared sense of
social responsibility. Although our understanding of the mechanisms that drive the emergence and diffusion
of crime is still incomplete, recent research highlights applied mathematics and methods of statistical physics
as valuable theoretical resources that may help us better understand criminal activity. We review different
approaches aimed at modeling and improving our understanding of crime, focusing on the nucleation of crime
hotspots using partial differential equations, self-exciting point process and agent-based modeling, adversarial
evolutionary games, and the network science behind the formation of gangs and large-scale organized crime.
We emphasize that statistical physics of crime can relevantly inform the design of successful crime prevention
strategies, as well as improve the accuracy of expectations about how different policing interventions should
impact malicious human activity deviating from social norms. We also outline possible directions for future
research, related to the effects of social and coevolving networks and to the hierarchical growth of criminal
structures due to self-organization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An unattended broken window invites bypassers to behave
mischievously or even disorderly. Soon, one broken window
may become many, and the inception of urban decay is in
place. Similarly, a subway graffiti, however beautiful and
harmless in appearance, points to an unkept environment that
anyone can desecrate, signaling that more egregious damage
will be tolerated. Panhandlers, drunks, addicts, prostitutes,
and loiterers are more likely to frequent neglected subway
stations than orderly and carefully patrolled ones. The 1982
seminal paper by Wilson and Kelling [1] contains many more
lucid examples and anecdotes to introduce the “broken win-
dows theory”, articulating how seemingly unimportant and
petty signals of urban disorder may elicit antisocial behav-
ior and serious crime. Although not immune from criticism,
this work has since become a widely adopted criminological
theory.
To mathematicians and physicists, the broken windows
theory may be reminiscent of complexity science and self-
organized criticality [4], where seemingly small and irrelevant
changes at the local level frequently have unexpected con-
sequences at the global level later in time. Feedback loops,
bifurcations and catastrophes [5], as well as phase transi-
tions [6], are commonly associated with emergent phenomena
stemming from the nonlinearities inherent to complex social
systems [7]. Crime is ubiquitous, yet far from being uniformly
distributed across space or time [8–13]. This is evidenced also
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FIG. 1: Dynamic changes in residential burglary hotspots for two
consecutive three-month periods, starting June 2011, in Long Beach,
California. The emergence of different burglary patterns is related to
how offenders move within their environments and how they respond
to the successes and failures of their illicit activities. Residential bur-
glars tend to return to previously victimized locations, or to their
close vicinities, after having acquired information on the properties,
the schedules of inhabitants, possible surveillance systems – a rea-
soning that is closely aligned with “routine activity theory” [2]. The
figure is reproduced from [3].
by the dynamic nucleation and dissipation of crime hotspots
shown in Fig. 1 [3, 14], as well as by the emergence of
complex geographical gang and organized crime networks.
Such intriguing pattern formation naturally invites quantita-
tive mathematical analyses, to which we attend in this review.
We consider crime as a complex phenomenon, where
nonlinear feedback loops and self-organization give rise to
system-wide unexpected behaviors that are difficult to under-
stand and control [15]. Data provided by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation shown in Fig. 2 suggest that crime deterrence
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2FIG. 2: The persistence of crime over time despite our best preven-
tion and punishment efforts. Data from the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation indicate that crime, regardless of type and severity, is re-
markably recurrent. Although positive and negative trends may be
inferred, crime events (measured as number of offenses per 100,000
population) between 1960 and 2010 fluctuate across time and space.
There is no evidence to support that crime rates are permanently de-
creasing. The U.S. state index is alphabetical, including the District
of Columbia being 9th, and the U.S. total being 52th.
policies are struggling to have the desired impact. Indeed, if
viewed over a time scale of decades, the relative frequency of
offenses, regardless of crime type, is heavily undulating and
lacks persistent downward momentum.
Outside the realm of mathematical modeling, there exist
well-known and widely accepted theories of criminal behav-
ior. According to “routine activity theory” [2], most criminal
acts are born out of the convergence of three factors: the pres-
ence of likely offenders and of suitable targets and the absence
of guardians to protect against the attempted crime. Residen-
tial burglary, grand theft auto, armed robberies, pickpocketing
and rape are examples of such criminal acts. Other crimes
may imply a precise target focus, such as in murder for re-
venge or other clan-type retaliation offenses.
If viewed upon sociologically, these “ingredients” of rou-
tine activity theory are relatively straightforward conditions
that obviously favor criminal activity. Mathematically, how-
ever, routine activity theory allows us to model criminal of-
fender dynamics as deviations from simple random walks.
This is due to built-in heterogeneities in target selection that
may drive criminal activity towards preferred locations and
away from less desired ones, marked, say, by better surveil-
lance systems, more physical obstacles to break-ins or thefts,
and in general by a higher, real or perceived, risk vs. reward
ratio. The degree of target “attractiveness” may change in time
and depend on mundane factors such as the day of the week
or weather conditions, or on the more sophisticated interplay
between landscape, criminal activity and law enforcement re-
sponses. Crime dynamics may also include learning mecha-
nisms or feedback loops. All these elements lead to the emer-
gence of non-trivial patterns such as spatially localized crime
hotspots as shown in Fig. 1 for grand-theft auto in the city of
Long Beach, California: note how hotspots diffuse over time
in a nontrivial manner. Another interesting phenomenon is
that of repeat and near-repeat victimization in the case of res-
idential burglary [16–19], whereby for a given period of time
after a first break-in, the odds of a second victimization are
greatly enhanced both for the original target site and locations
in its near vicinity.
The complexity of crime dynamics and the many factors
that influence criminal activity render mitigation and displace-
ment of crime a non trivial task [20–24]. Rational choice
theories applied to crime may be too simplistic in assuming
straightforward gain-loss principles, for example that stronger
punishment would automatically lead to less crime [25, 26].
In this work, we review recent quantitative mathematical mod-
els of crime where statistical physics, complexity science,
game theory and self-organized criticality are used in an at-
tempt to understand the multiple aspects of crime and to iden-
tify possible prevention and amelioration strategies.
The organization of this review is as follows. In Section II,
we will focus on a set of reaction-diffusion partial differential
equations to study the emergence, dynamics and possible sup-
pression of crime hotspots [3, 14, 19, 27, 28]. In Section III,
we will review the application of self-exciting point processes,
which are frequently used by seismologists to study space-
time clustering of earthquakes [29] to crime data [30–32].
Section IV will be devoted to the study of crime by means of
adversarial games and evolutionary social dilemmas [33–36].
In Section V, we will review mechanisms behind the growth
and structure of criminal networks and the formation of gangs
[37], while in Section VI, we will survey a rehabilitation and
recidivism model [38] that reveals an optimal resolution of
the “stick versus carrot” dilemma [39–46]. We will conclude
with a summary and an outlook in Section VII, describing the
implication of statistical physics of crime and outlining viable
directions for future research related to agent-based modeling,
hierarchical growth, and self-organization.
II. CRIME HOTSPOTS
Empirical observations of spatiotemporal clusters of crime
in urban areas, such as those presented in Fig. 1, motivated the
development of a statistical model of criminal behavior, which
was introduced and studied in [3]. The model was developed
to study residential burglary, one of the simplest instances of
opportunistic, routine activity crime. Here, target sites – res-
idential homes – are stationary and one can focus on burglar
dynamics only, as opposed to crimes where both offender and
targets are mobile, as in the case of assault or pickpocketing.
Burglars most often opportunistically victimize areas that
are sufficiently, but not too close to where they live, and where
they have committed crimes before [47]. Aside from a small
exclusion zone centered around their own residences, the dis-
3tances that criminals are willing to travel to engage in criminal
acts are best described by monotonically decreasing functions
[48]. Offender movement is usually described as a biased ran-
dom walk. The bias is twofold. One one hand, from a bur-
glar’s perspective, a given target home may be intrinsically
more attractive than another due to its perceived wealth, the
ease in accessing it, or the predictable routine of its occupants.
On the other, there may be learned elements that bias the bur-
glar towards a specific location. For instance, a criminal may
return to a previously victimized home or to its immediate
neighborhood, having already learnt the details of the area,
and having acquired the know-how for a successful break-in.
To quantify the bias towards any given location and to deter-
mine the subsequent rate of burglary, the crime model of [3]
includes a dynamically changing “attractiveness” field. The
tendency for repeat victimization [16–19] is included in the
model by temporarily increasing the attractiveness field in re-
sponse to past burglary events [49, 50] both at the burglary site
and in its near vicinity. Since potential crime targets in case of
residential burglary do not move, it is convenient to start with
a discrete model on a square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. Each lattice site s = (i, j) is a house or real es-
tate with attractiveness As(t). The higher the value of As(t),
the higher the bias towards site s and the more likely will it
be victimized. Moreover, once site s has been victimized, its
attractiveness further increases. The following decomposition
is introduced
As(t) = A
0
s +Bs(t), (1)
whereA0s is the static, though possibly spatially varying, com-
ponent of the attractiveness field, andBs(t) represents the dy-
namic component associated with repeat and near-repeat vic-
timization [16, 47]. Specifically, Bs(t+ 1) = Bs(t)(1−ω) +
Es(t), where ω sets a time scale over which repeat victim-
izations are most likely to occur and Es(t) is the number of
burglary events that occurred at site s during t and t + 1. To
take into account the broken windows theory [1], we letBs(t)
spread locally from each site s towards its nearest neighbors
s′ according to
Bs(t+1) =
[
(1− η)Bs(t) + η
z
∑
s′
Bs′(t)
]
(1−ω)+Es(t)
(2)
where the sum runs over the nearest neighbor sites associated
to site s, z is the coordination number of the lattice and η is
a parameter between zero and one that determines the signif-
icance of neighborhood effects. Higher values of η lead to
a greater degree of spreading of the attractiveness generated
by a given burglary event, and vice-versa for lower values.
In this review we assume, for simplicity, that the spacing be-
tween sites ` and the discrete time unit δt over which criminal
actions occur are both equal to one, and that every time a site
s is burglarized its dynamic attractiveness Bs(t) increases by
one. Interaction networks other than the square lattice, that
may better describe the city grid or social networks for other
types of crime [51–53], and even coevolving or dynamically
changing networks [54–57], can be easily accommodated in a
similar way.
FIG. 3: The evolution of crime hotspots. Depending mainly on the
number of criminals, hotspots may either not appear at all (top row),
be transient (middle row) or stationary (bottom row). If criminals are
few, crime hotspots are likely transient and driven by randomness
(middle row), while if criminals are many, the crime hotspots either
never appear (top row) or they do and are stationary (bottom row).
To classify different outcomes, a continuum model is derived and a
linear stability analysis is performed, results of which are described
in the text. From left to right, the color maps encode the time evo-
lution of the attractiveness field As(t) (see Eq. 1), such that green
represents the midpoint and values below and above follow the rain-
bow spectrum from violet (minimum) to red (maximum). We refer
to [3], from where this figure has been adapted, for further details.
Criminal activity is included in the model by allowing in-
dividuals to perform one of two actions at every time step. A
criminal may either burglarize the site he or she currently oc-
cupies, or move to a neighboring one. Burglaries are mod-
eled as random events occurring with probability ps(t) =
1 − exp[−As(t)]. Whenever site s is burglarized, the cor-
responding criminal is removed from the lattice, representing
the tendency of actual burglars to flee the location of their
crime. To balance burglar removal, new criminal agents are
generated at a rate Γ uniformly on the lattice. If site s is not
burglarized, the criminal will move to one of its neighboring
sites with probability 1 − ps(t) = exp[−As(t)]. The move-
ment is modeled as a biased random walk so that site s′ is
visited with probability
qs→s′(t) =
As′(t)∑
s′
As′(t)
, (3)
where the sum runs over all neighboring sites of s. The po-
sition of the criminals and the biasing attractiveness field in
Eqs. 1 and 2 create nonlinear feedback loops which may give
rise to complex patterns of aggregation that are reminiscent
of actual crime hotspots, similar to those depicted in Fig. 1.
4FIG. 4: Crime hotspot suppression. Upper row: crime hotspots
emerging via a supercritical bifurcation and subjected to suppression.
The stationary solution on which the suppression is initiated is shown
in the left panel. The targeted crime hotspots disappear leading to a
transition period characterized by a “hot ring” solution around the
location of the original central hotspot (middle panel). Eventually,
new hotspots emerge in positions adjacent to the original ones (right
panel). Crime has been displaced but not eradicated. Lower row:
crime hotspots emerging via a subcritical bifurcation and subjected
to suppression. The stationary solution on which the suppression is
initiated is shown in the left panel. The hotspot gradually vanishes
without giving rise to new hotspots in nearby locations (middle and
right panels). Crime has been eradicated. All depicted solutions were
obtained with Eqs. 4 and 5. From left to right, the color maps encode
the time evolution of the attractiveness B, using the same color pro-
file as in Fig. 3. We refer to [14], from where this figure has been
adapted, for further details.
Results for As(t) are shown in Fig. 3. Depending on param-
eter values, it is possible to observe three different behavioral
regimes. In the upper row, all localized increases ofAs(t) that
emerge due to recent burglaries disappear very quickly, result-
ing in a predominantly homogeneous attractiveness field. In
the middle row, crime hotspots emerge at random locations
and they persist for different periods of time before disappear-
ing or diffusing elsewhere. Lastly, in the bottom row, station-
ary crime hotspots emerge, which are surrounded by areas of
extremely low As(t) values. Interestingly, a high number of
criminals can result in either the absence of hotspots or in-
tense stationary hotspots. The model actually displays four
different regimes of As(t) (see Fig. 3 in [3] for details), but
for simplicity we here restrict ourselves to reviewing the three
most distinctive cases shown in Fig. 3.
On the basis of the discrete system it is possible to derive
a continuum model, the bifurcation analysis of which yields
a more thorough understanding of the spatiotemporal dynam-
ics summarized in Fig. 3. From the continuum model one
can also outline suggestions for crime hotspot suppression and
policing [14, 27]. The continuum version of the dynamics of
the attractiveness field is
∂B
∂t
=
ηD
z
∇2B − ωB + DρA, (4)
where D = `2/δt,  = δt, and ρ(s, t) = ns(t)/`2. Details of
the derivation are described in [3]. The continuum equation
for criminal number density, denoted as ρ is given by
∂ρ
∂t
=
D
z
~∇ ·
[
~∇ρ− 2ρ
A
~∇A
]
− ρA+ γ, (5)
where offenders exit the system at a rate ρA, and are reintro-
duced at a constant rate per unit area γ = Γ/`2. Equations 4
and 5 are coupled partial differential equations that describe
the spatiotemporal evolution of the attractiveness B and the
offender population ρ. They belong to the general class of
reaction-diffusion equations that often lead to spatial pattern
formation [58].
For a detailed mathematical treatment of Eqs. 4 and 5, as
well as the derivation of their dimensionless form, we refer to
[3, 14, 27]. Here we summarize the analysis, which shows that
parameters used to obtain the first and second row of Fig. 3
correspond to the case where the continuum equations allow
for a stable uniform solution, while parameters used to obtain
the third row of Fig. 3 correspond to the case where the uni-
form solution is unstable. The emerging picture is that crime
hotspots form when the enhanced risk of repeat crimes – mea-
sured as a function of all relevant parameters – is high enough
to diffuse locally without binding distant crimes together (for
details see Fig. 2 in [14]). Within the unstable regime, the for-
mation of crime hotspots may occur either via supercritical or
subcritical bifurcations. In order to study the effects of police
intervention, the crime rate ρA in Eq. 5 is set to zero at given
hotspot locations and for a given time frame [14]. Numeri-
cal studies reveal that only subcritical crime hotspots may be
permanently eradicated via the above described suppression
mechanism, while supercritical hotspots are only displaced.
The two different outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 4, where the
upper and bottom rows show the suppression of supercritical
and subcritical crime hotspots, respectively.
Further research on this model include the introduction of
spatial disorder, methods for police suppression to dynami-
cally adapt to evolving crime patterns or to choose from differ-
ent deployment strategies and more rigorous analysis [28, 59–
62]. Other mathematical work on the spread of crime in
society include dynamical systems that include competition
between citizens, criminals and guards [63], the effects of
socio–economic classes, changes in police efficiency and/or
resources assigned to them [64], the effects of imprisonment
and recidivism [65] and the possibility of communities de-
fending themselves from criminals [66]. Viewed as a whole,
this body of work may prove useful in developing better and
more cost-effective crime mitigation methods and to allow for
the optimization of containment and suppression resources.
III. SELF-EXCITING POINT PROCESS MODELING
Certain types of crime, like burglary and gang violence, ap-
pear clustered in time and space and are reminiscent of earth-
quake activity. The clustering patterns observed by seismol-
ogists indicate that the occurrence of an earthquake is likely
to induce a series of aftershocks near the location of the ini-
tial event, leading to earthquake swarms and clusters. Sim-
5ilar induction phenomena may be observed in crime pattern
formation, motivating the application of seismology methods
to model criminal activity. One of these methods is the self-
exciting point processes [30].
A space-time point process is a collection of points repre-
senting the location (x, y) and the time t of occurrence of a
given event, such as an earthquake, the striking of lighten-
ing or the birth of a species. The process is associated to a
conditional rate λ(x, y, t), indicating the rate of occurrence of
events at location (x, y) conditioned on the history H(t) of
the point process up to time t [29]. In seismology, point pro-
cesses are used by considering a “parent earthquake” and sub-
sequent background events or aftershocks. Background activ-
ity is modeled as a stationary Poisson process with arrival rate
µ(x, y) that depends on all previous seismic events. After-
shocks are described via a triggering function g(x, y, t) that
also depends on previous seismic occurrences, but whose am-
plitude decreases as a function of the spatio-temporal distance
from them. The function g also depends on the magnitude of
past earthquakes. These ideas have been translated into crim-
inal modeling by similarly considering “parent crimes” and
subsequent background or offspring crimes. A few modifica-
tions in going from earthquake to crime modeling are neces-
sary such as the introduction of a multiplicative factor ν(t) in
the background activity which embodies global fluctuations
due to weather, seasonality or time of day. Also, while in seis-
mology decades of research and refinement have lead to well
defined functional forms for g, in crime non-parametric meth-
ods and calibrations using actual data are used to estimate g
as well ν and µ. For details on the forms of µ and g used in
seismology and on the iterative procedures used in crime we
refer to the seminal work by Mohler et al. [30].
The application of self-exciting point process modeling to
urban crime has been tested using residential burglary data
provided by the Los Angeles Police Department [30]. Pre-
vious methods of predicting crime had been introduced in the
literature [67] where crime hotspot maps were generated via
a pre-assigned fixed kernel, using previous crime occurrences
as input. The point process methodology has been found su-
perior to the crime hotspot map, even for robberies or auto
theft where near-repeat effects play less of a role. The main
advantage of point process modeling has been attributed to a
better balance between exogenous and endogenous contribu-
tions to crime rates and to its direct inference from data rather
than an a priori imposition of hotspot maps. Accordingly, the
usage of self-exciting point process modeling is in many ways
superior to using a pre-assigned fixed kernel.
Self-exciting point processes have also been used to ana-
lyze temporal patterns of civilian death reports in Iraq be-
tween 2003 and 2007 [32]. Similarly to urban crimes, the
rate of violent events has been partitioned into the sum of
a Poisson background rate and a self-exciting component in
which previous bombings or other episodes of violence gen-
erate a sequence of offspring events according to a Poisson
distribution. Comparing with actual data, the study showed
that point processes are well suited for modeling the tempo-
ral dynamics of violence in Iraq. Point processes may also
be used in geographic profiling of criminal offenders to esti-
mate the probability density for the home base of a criminal
who has committed a given set of spatially distributed crimes.
Target selection from a hypothetical home base is informed
by geographic inhomogeneities such as housing types, parks,
freeways or other physical barriers as well as directional bias
and preferred distances to crime [31]. In the context of ge-
ographic profiling, point processes are used to estimate the
crime probability density given a set of spatially distributed
crimes. In more recent work, self-exciting point processes
have been used to model intra-gang violence due to retalia-
tion after an initial attack [68].
Overall, the application of self-exciting point processes, in-
spired by earthquake prediction in seismology, can be used
successfully for modeling and predicting crime, as demon-
strated on residential burglary data from the Los Angeles
Police Department [30] and on temporal patterns of civilian
death reports in Iraq [32]. In the future it may be desirable to
further tailor point process models specifically for crime type
and local geography and to refine the construction of para-
metric models which could facilitate the application of this
promising methodology.
IV. CRIME AS A SOCIAL DILEMMA
Evolutionary game theory [69–73] has been the traditional
framework of choice for studying the evolution of different
behavioral strategies in a competitive setting [74–77]. From
the large array of possible games, few have received as much
attention as the prisoner’s dilemma [78]. Here, within each
round, two players must decide simultaneously whether they
want to cooperate with each other or not. Each player then
receives a payoff that depends on the mutual decisions made.
A “social dilemma” arises because cooperation between both
players would yield the highest collective payoff, but the pay-
off for a defector is higher if the opponent decides to cooper-
ate. Mutual defection is therefore the only rational outcome
that emerges if both players act selfishly so as to maximize
their individual profit. In the long run, the proliferation of de-
fection inevitably leads to the “tragedy of the commons” [79],
where common resources are lost to society due to overex-
ploitation and lack of cooperative care.
Although criminal behavior does not necessarily map to
the prisoner’s dilemma, it is nevertheless possible, and in-
deed very rewarding, to study the evolution of crime within
the framework of social dilemmas [80]. In this context, social
order can be considered as the common good that is threat-
ened by criminal activity, with competition arising between
criminals and those trying to prevent crime. However, com-
mitting crimes is not necessarily equivalent to defection, since
criminals, unlike defectors, may actively seek to harm others.
By the same token, fighting crime can be more than simply
to cooperate, in particular since it may involve risk that goes
beyond contributing some fraction of one’s “wealth” into the
common pool. Although in principle committing crime and
defecting, as well as fighting crime and cooperating are in
good correspondence, a more deliberate formulation of the
competing strategies may elevate the accuracy of the model-
6FIG. 5: Crime as an evolutionary game. The society is composed
of four strategies – informants, paladins, villains and apathetics –
defined by their propensities to both commit crimes and serve as wit-
nesses in criminal investigations. Arrows between strategies indicate
the number of possible game pairings and outcomes in which the up-
date step leads to a strategy change. For example, there are two ways
by means of which a villain can be converted into a paladin. Circular
arrows within each strategy quadrant indicate updates where player
strategies remain unchanged. This figure has been reproduced from
[33].
ing approach.
With these considerations in mind, an adversarial evolu-
tionary game including four competing strategies can be con-
structed [33] as summarized in Fig. 5. The game entails in-
formants (I) and villains (V ) as those who commit crimes, as
well as paladins (P ) and apathetics (A) as those who do not.
Informants and paladins actively contribute to crime abate-
ment by collaborating with authorities whenever called upon
to do so. All players may witness crimes or be the victims
of crime, in agreement with victimization surveys [81]. Thus,
paladins are model citizens that do not commit crimes and col-
laborate with authorities, while villains, to the other extreme
of the spectrum, commit crimes and do not report them. In-
termediate figures are informants who report on other offend-
ers while still committing crimes, and apathetics who neither
commit crimes nor report to authorities. The lack of active
cooperation in apathetics may be due to inherent apathy, fear
of retaliation or ostracism from the community at large. Apa-
thetics are similar to second-order free-riders in the context of
the public goods game with punishment [40, 82], in that they
cooperate at first order by not committing crimes, but defect
at second order by not punishing offenders.
The game unfolds iteratively. At each round a criminal is
randomly selected from the V + I pool together with a poten-
tial victim from the N − 1 remainder of the population. The
two selected players begin the game with a unitary payoff. Af-
ter a crime occurs, the criminal player increases its payoff by
δ, while the victim looses δ. If the victim is either an apathetic
or a villain, the crime is not reported to the authorities and
therefore successful: the victim’s payoff is decreased to 1− δ
and the victimizer’s is increased to 1+δ. If, on the other hand,
the victim is a paladin or an informant, the crime is reported to
the authorities and an “investigation” begins. For this, a subset
M of theN−2 remaining players is drawn, and the victimizer
FIG. 6: The emergence of utopia in a society with informants. All
trajectories with I0 > 0 evolve towards a crime-free state. The phase
diagram shows unstable fixed points in light red, unstable fixed lines
in thick light red, stable fixed lines in thick dark blue, and trajectories
beginning (or ending) along various eigenvectors as thick green ar-
rows. The dystopian fixed point d and the saddle point s are unstable
to increases in I , so that the only attracting final states for I0 > 0
are those utopias with P > Pc. These results were obtained with
δ = 0.3, θ = 0.6 and  = 0.2, but qualitative results are indepen-
dent of parameters. This figure has been reproduced from [33].
is convicted with probability w = (mP +mI)/M , where mP
and mI are the number of paladins and informants within M .
In case of a conviction, the victim is refunded δ, and payoff of
the criminal becomes 1 − θ, where θ determines the severity
of punishment. With probability 1 − w the crime is left un-
punished, in which case the criminal retains 1 + δ, while the
victim’s payoff is further decreased to 1 − δ − . Here  may
be interpreted as retaliation on the accuser as perpetrated by
the accused who, having escaped punishment, feels empow-
ered in his or her revenge. Other interpretations of  may be
damages to personal image or credibility, or a loss of “faith
in the system” after making an accusation that is unsubstanti-
ated by the community. Note that in the latter case, the choice
of reporting one’s victimization to authorities may be even
more detrimental to the witness than the original criminal act
( > δ). This scenario especially applies to societies heavily
marred by war, by mafia or drug cartels, where few people
will serve as witnesses to crimes. Parameters δ, θ and  are
always used such that all payoffs remain positive. At the end
of each round of the game, the player with the smaller payoff
changes his or her strategy according to proportional imita-
tion [83]. In particular, if the victimizer is emulated, the loser
simply adopts the victimizer’s strategy and ends the update as
either a villain or an informant. If the victim is emulated, the
loser mimics the victim’s propensity to serve as a witness but
adopts a noncriminal strategy regardless of the victim’s. In
this case, the update results with the loser becoming either a
paladin or an apathetic (see Fig. 5 for details).
Stochastic simulations reveal that informants are key to the
emergence of a crime-free society – “utopia”. Indeed, a crime-
dominated society can be transitioned to one that is largely
crime-free by imposing an optimal number of informants I0
at the onset of the game. The dynamics depend on the chosen
parameterizations and utopia may be more difficult to achieve
7FIG. 7: Human experiments confirm that informants are key to di-
minishing crime. Depicted are comparisons of the strategy evolu-
tions simulated from theory (left) and obtained from experimental
sessions (right). In the top row all four strategies are allowed, while
in the bottom row informants are disallowed. Both simulation and
human experiment outcomes confirm that the absence of informants
leads to elevated levels of criminal behavior. Future challenges re-
main to determine how well the model and the human experiment
actually fit to a potential real-life scenario. Paladins are red circles,
apathetics are blue squares, informants are orange triangles, and vil-
lains are green diamonds. For further details we refer to [34], from
which this figure was adapted.
in an extremely adversarial society, with initial high numbers
of villains and apathetics. However, by deriving a determinis-
tic version of the above described game [33] it is possible to
show that if there are at least some informants initially present
in the population (I0 > 0) the final state is always utopia re-
gardless of δ, θ and . This is illustrated in Fig. 6, which
features a 4D ternary phase diagram of the four competing
strategies.
While beneficial, the presence of informants may come at a
cost, either in training an undercover informant, or in convinc-
ing a criminal to collaborate with authorities, or in tolerating
the criminal acts that informants will keep committing. One
may thus consider an optimal control problem [35] to inves-
tigate the active recruitment of informants from the general
population in terms of associated costs and benefits. Higher
recruitment levels may be the most beneficial in abating crime,
but they may also be prohibitively expensive. Recruitment
costs are designed to depend on the past history of players
so that the conversion of individuals with higher cumulative
past payoffs might be more costly than that of less success-
ful ones [35]. The optimal control problem was expressed via
three control functions subject to a system of delay differen-
tial equations, and was solved and discussed under different
settings. Targeted and random recruitment of informants were
also considered. Optimal recruitment strategies were shown
to change drastically as parameters and resource constraints
were varied and that more information about individual player
strategies leads only to marginally lower costs.
The crucial role of informants within the reviewed adver-
sarial evolutionary game [33] has also been studied by means
of human experiments in [34]. The goal was to test whether
informants are indeed critical towards crime abatement as pre-
dicted by theory. Quite remarkably, as illustrated in Fig. 7,
good agreement between the outcome of the stochastic simu-
lations and the laboratory experiments was obtained for differ-
ent parameterizations of the game. Human experiments thus
confirmed that reaching and maintaining a low-crime society
may be favored by seeking cooperation with active criminals.
Details on adaptations of the theoretical game to a laboratory
setting and nuanced considerations on the role of informants
in the two settings are described in [34].
The evolution of crime can also be studied through the lens
of the inspection game [84]. Rational choice theories predict
that increasing fines should diminish crime [25]. However, a
three strategy inspection game, where in addition to criminals
(C) and punishing inspectors (P ), ordinary individuals (O)
are present as well leads to very different outcomes [36] than
what expected. The O players neither commit crimes nor par-
ticipate in inspection activities and represent the “masses” that
catalyze rewards for criminals and costs for inspectors. Ordi-
nary individuals receive no bonus payoffs upon encountering
inspectors or their peers. Only when paired with criminals do
they suffer the consequences of crime in form of a negative
payoff −g ≤ 0. Criminals, vice-versa, gain the reward g ≥ 0
for committing a crime. When paired with inspectors crimi-
nals receive a payoff g−f , where f ≥ 0 is a punishment fine.
When two criminals are paired none of the two are assigned
any benefits. Inspectors, on the other hand, always have the
cost of inspection, c ≥ 0, but when confronted with a crim-
inal, an inspector receives the reward r ≥ 0 for a successful
apprehension. This game was studied via Monte Carlo simu-
lations on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions
where each lattice site is occupied either by a criminal, a pun-
ishing inspector, or an ordinary citizen. The game evolves by
first randomly selecting player s to play the inspection game
with its four nearest neighbors, yielding the payoff Ps. One of
the nearest neighbors of player s, s′ is now chosen randomly
to play the game with its nearest neighbors, leading to Ps′
analogously to player s before. Finally, player s′ imitates the
strategy of player s with probability
q =
1
1 + exp(Ps′ − Ps)/K] , (6)
where K determines the level of uncertainty in the strategy
adoption process. The chosen form in Eq. 6 corresponds to the
empirically supported multinomial logit model [85], which
for two decision alternatives is also known as the Fermi law
[86, 87]. A finite value of K accounts for the fact that better
performing players are readily imitated, although it is not im-
possible to adopt a player performing worse, for example due
to imperfect information or errors in decision making.
Monte Carlo simulations reveal that the collective behav-
ior of the three-strategy spatial inspection game is complex
and counterintuitive. As depicted in Fig. 8, continuous (solid
lines) and discontinuous (dashed lines) transitions between
different phases emerge. For the left panel of Fig. 8, where
we use low reward values r for successful inspection, these
include (i) a dominance of criminals for high rewards of com-
mitting a crime g and high inspection costs c (the C phase),
8(ii) a coexistence of criminals and punishing inspectors for
large values of g and moderate values of c (the P +C phase),
(iii) a dominance of punishing inspectors for moderate inspec-
tion costs and low values of g (the P phase), and (iv) cycli-
cal dominance for small inspection costs and small values of
g (the C + O + P phase). In the cyclic dominance phase
criminals beat ordinary individuals, ordinary individuals beat
punishing inspectors, and punishing inspectors win against the
criminals. Noteworthy, the C + O + P phase yields oscilla-
tory behavior, where C beat O, O beat P , and P beat C, thus
closing the dominance loop (C → O → P → C). The cyclic
dominance that is responsible for strategy density oscillations
emerges spontaneously due to pattern formation and is robust
against initial condition variations.
The three-strategy inspection game shows that the interplay
between criminal activities and sanctioning efforts may be
complex and lead to non-linear dynamics that may make it dif-
ficult to devise successful intuitive crime prevention policies.
Other game-theoretic optimization studies include finding the
best way to defend multiple sites against criminal attempts
who also must choose among several attack locations [88].
Results from this section indicate that crime should be viewed
not only as the result of offending actions committed by cer-
tain individuals, but also as the result of social interactions
between people who adjust their behavior in response to soci-
etal cues and imitative interactions. The emergence of crime
thus should not be ascribed merely to the “criminal nature”
of particular individuals, but rather to the social context, the
systems of rewards and punishment, the level of engagement
of the community, as well as to the interactions between in-
dividuals. This more comprehensive view of crime may have
relevant implications for policies and law enforcement.
V. NETWORKS OF CRIME, GANGS AND GEOGRAPHY
A natural extension of the research reviewed thus far, where
the focus has been on crime hotspots and the propensity of sin-
gle individuals to commit crime, is to consider criminal net-
works, the formation of gangs, and the geography of crime
building, and in particular how these topics could benefit from
recent advances in network science [52, 89–93]. Forms of
large-scale organized crime [94], such as the Italian Mafia
[95], street gangs, or drug cartels [96] usually emerge when
fear and despair become so ingrained within a society that the
social norm is simply to accept crime, so that witnesses and
even victims of crime choose not to cooperate with law en-
forcement in the prosecution of criminals. Instead, one tries
to fit in. Acquiescence and acceptance are usually slippery
slopes towards later forms of active engagement, leading to
the growth of the local criminal organization or a criminal
network. Criminological research has identified a number of
factors that may promote the regional development of crime,
including unemployment [97, 98], economic deprivation [99],
untoward youth culture [100], failing social institutions [101],
issues with political legitimacy [99], as well as lenient local
law enforcement strategies [102, 103], to name but a few ex-
amples. Recent work on declining criminal behavior in the
FIG. 8: Phase diagrams demonstrating the spontaneous emergence
and stability of the recurrent nature of crime and other possible out-
comes of the evolutionary competition between criminals (C), ordi-
nary people (O) and the police (P ). The diagrams show the strate-
gies remaining on the square lattice after sufficiently long relaxation
times as a function of the inspection cost c and the temptation to
commit crime g, for low (left) and high (right) reward of success-
ful inspection r. The overlayed color map encodes the stationary
density of criminals in the population (crime rate). For small and
intermediate values of c and g, cyclic dominance between the three
strategies characterizes the evolutionary dynamics. Criminals out-
perform ordinary people, ordinary people outperform the police, and
the police outperform criminals. This cyclic dominance leads to re-
current outbreaks of crime during the evolutionary process. If either
c or g exceed a certain threshold, the cyclic phase ends with a con-
tinuous phase transition to a mixed P + C phase (lower solid line),
where police and criminals coexist. Further increasing the two pa-
rameters leads to another continuous transition (upper solid line) and
an absorbing C phase, where criminals dominate. A re-entry into the
cyclic C +O+P phase is possible through a succession of two dis-
continuous phase transitions (dashed lines) occurring for sufficiently
small g and decreasing inspection costs. First, the absorbingC phase
changes abruptly to an absorbing P phase dominated by inspectors,
which then changes abruptly to the cyclic phase. If r is larger (right),
the region of cyclic dominance increases, but the possibility of com-
plete dominance of the police also vanishes. Dash-dotted gray lines
correspond to the condition where the probability for criminals to
be detected p is the same as the temptation to commit crime, and a
transition to criminal behavior would thus be expected according to
the rational choice theory. For further details we refer to [36], from
where this figure was adapted.
U.S. in fact suggests that trends in the levels of crime may be
best understood as arising from a complex interplay of many
such factors [104, 105], while most recent empirical data indi-
cate that social networks of criminals have a particulary strong
impact on the occurrence of crime – the more the criminals are
connected into networks, the higher the crime rate [106, 107].
The assumption that there is a network structure behind or-
ganized crime immediately invites the idea that removing the
leader, or the most important hubs of the network [109], will
disrupt the organization to its very core and thus hinder fur-
ther criminal activity. Police thus often attempt to identify
and arrest the “ring leader” of the targeted criminal organi-
zation. But even if successful, such operations rarely have
the desired effect. A recent study analyzing cannabis produc-
tion and distribution networks in the Netherlands shows that
this strategy may be fundamentally flawed [108]. As depicted
in Fig. 9, all attempts towards network disruption analyzed in
9FIG. 9: A cannabis cultivation criminal network in the Netherlands.
Nodes represent the many actors needed for successful production
and distribution of cannabis. The network is highly resilient to tar-
geted disruption strategies and perturbations will lead to reorganiza-
tion towards a more robust and resilient network. Node sizes repre-
sent the number of actors fulfilling the associated role, and link thick-
ness corresponds to the total number of links between actor groups.
For further details we refer to [108], from where this figure has been
reproduced.
the study proved to be at best unsuccessful, at worse increased
the efficiency of the network, which through nifty reorganiza-
tions and recovery ultimately became stronger. By combin-
ing computational modeling and social network analysis with
unique criminal network intelligence data from the Dutch Po-
lice, Duijn et al. [108] have concluded that criminal network
interventions are likely to be effective only if applied at the
very early stages of network growth, before the network gets
a chance to organize, or to reorganize to maximum resilience.
Gangs are similar to criminal networks, although their ac-
tivity is usually more geographically constrained and segre-
gated [110, 111], and their organization features less hierar-
chy and complexity. The seminal work by Schelling on dy-
namic models of segregation [112] and subsequent variations
[113–115] considered agent-based modeling on a square lat-
tice to take into account structured time-invariable interactions
[116]. The consideration of a structured rather than a well-
mixed population is crucial because, in a criminal network
or a gang, not everybody is connected to everybody else, and
the interactions among members usually follow an established
pattern that does not vary over time. Although the usage of
realistic social networks might be even more appropriate, the
square lattice is a good first-order approximation. The latter
allow for the implementation of statistical physics methods
[117] which have long been used to analyze related systems
of interacting particles [118].
The creation of street gang rivalries was studied via agent-
based simulations in conjunction with data from the Hollen-
beck policing division of the Los Angeles Police Department
[119], home to many urban gangs. Each agent is part of an
evolving rivalry network that includes past interactions be-
FIG. 10: Reconstructing a gang network. Interactions between
agents simulated using the biased Le´vy walk network method (left) .
Actual density map of gang-related violent crimes in Hollenbeck be-
tween 1998 and 2000 (right). Thick lines represent major freeways
crossing the city. Further details are described in [119], from where
this figure has been reproduced.
tween gang members. Individuals perform random walks
where the jump length is drawn from a truncated Le´vy dis-
tribution and where bias in the direction of rivals is included.
Gang home bases, historical turfs and geographic details that
may limit movement such as freeways, rivers and parks are in-
cluded in the so called simulated biased Le´vy walk network,
as well as typical gang behaviors inferred from the criminol-
ogy literature. Simplified baseline models are also simulated
and results from all models are compared with actual gang
networks in Hollenbeck. Using metrics derived from graph
theory, it is possible to show that simulated biased Le´vy walk
network modeling is the most accurate in replicating the actual
gang network, compared to the other, more simple methods.
For comparison we show simulated results and an actual map
of violent crimes in Hollenbeck in Fig. 10. Furthermore, the
simulated biased Le´vy walk network converges to stable long-
term configurations, which is useful when modeling unknown
rivalry interactions. The method is portable and can be ap-
plied to other geographical locations, offering insight on gang
rivalry distributions in the absence of known data. It may also
be extended to test sociological concepts related to gang inter-
actions such as territoriality and/or allegiances within gangs.
Police department field interview cards were later used to
study the behavioral patterns of roughly 748 suspected gang
members who were stopped and questioned in Hollenbeck
[120]. The goal was to identify any social communities among
street gang members by creating a fully–connected ad hoc
graph where individuals represent nodes and links encode ge-
ographical and social data. Individuals stopped together were
assumed to share a friendly or social link and the distance di,j
between stop locations of individuals was recorded. This in-
formation was used to determine the affinity matrixWi,j asso-
ciated with the graph. Its entries are composed of a term that
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decays as a function of di,j , representing geographical infor-
mation, and of an adjacency matrix whose entries are zero or
one depending on whether individuals were stopped together
or not. The latter represents social information. Using spectral
clustering methods distinct groups were identified and inter-
preted as distinct social communities among Hollenbeck gang
members. These clustered communities were then matched
with actual gang affiliations recorded from the police field in-
terview cards. To evaluate cluster quality the authors use a
purity measure, defined as the number of correctly identified
gang members in each cluster divided by the total number of
gang members. Results showed that using geographical in-
formation alone leads to clustering purity of about 56% with
respect to the true affiliations of the 748 individuals taken in
consideration. Adding social data may improve purity levels,
especially if this data is used in conjunction with other infor-
mation, such as friendship or rivalry networks. These results
may be used as a practical tool for law enforcement in pro-
viding useful starting points when trying to identify possible
culprits of a gang attack.
A mathematical approach to modeling gang aggregation
and territory formation by means of an Ising-like model on
a square lattice has recently also been proposed in [37]. Here,
otherwise indistinguishable agents are allowed to aggregate
within two distinct gangs and to lay graffiti on the sites they
occupy. Interactions among individuals are indirect and occur
only via the graffiti markings present on-site and on nearest-
neighbor sites. Graffiti is subject to decay either from the ele-
ments or from active police removal. Within this model, gang
clustering and territory formation may arise under specific pa-
rameter choices, and a phase transition may occur between
well-mixed, possibly dilute configurations and well separated,
clustered configurations. Using methods of statistical physics,
the phase transition between these two qualitatively different
scenarios has been studied in detail. In the mean-field rendi-
tion of the model, parameter regimes were identified where
the transition is first or second order. In all cases however,
these clustering transitions were driven by gang-to-graffiti
couplings since direct gang-to-gang interactions were not in-
cluded in the model. This leads to the conclusion that indirect
coupling between gangs, such as graffiti markings, may be the
sole catalyst for gang clustering. The role of graffiti and van-
dalism has been recently reviewed by Thompson et al. [121],
who analyzed the urban rail industry, where graffiti markings
have significant impact on expenditure, timely operation of
services, and on passenger perception of safety.
Lastly, we mention promising efforts to detect criminal or-
ganizations [122] and to predict crime [123] based on de-
mographics and mobile data. It is known that the usage of
communication media such as mobile phones and online so-
cial networks leaves digital traces, and research shows that
this data can be used successfully for detecting and charac-
terizing criminal organizations. With the aid of statistical
network analysis and community detection [124], recent ad-
vances could allow forensic investigators to better understand
hierarchies within criminal organizations, to discover mem-
bers who play central role, as well as provide valuable infor-
mation on connections among sub-groups [122].
FIG. 11: Minimizing recidivism requires carefully balanced rehabil-
itation programs, where both punishment and reward play a crucial
role. Either neglecting punishment in favor of generous rehabilita-
tion or vice versa will ultimately fail in successfully reintegrating
offenders into society. Depicted is the ratio between paladins and
unreformables P/U in dependence on the amount of resources for
rehabilitation h, as obtained for different values of the duration of
intervention τ (see top of individual graphs). In all cases the severity
of punishment θ is adjusted so that hτ+θ = C (see legend in the top
left graph), taking into account the fact that available resources are fi-
nite. The upper right graph reveals that the optimal parameter values
are h = 0.3, τ = 1.5 and θ = 0.35, which indicates that the most
successful strategy is to allocate the limited resources so that after be-
ing punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs,
especially during the first stages of their return to society. For further
details we refer to [38], from where this figure has been reproduced.
VI. REHABILITATION AND RECIDIVISM
Perhaps most fitting to end this review, we turn to rehabil-
itation and recidivism as successful and unsuccessful ends to
the treatment of past offenders, respectively. In addition to
punishing wrongdoers, the justice system should aim to reha-
bilitate and integrate past offenders into society. Recidivism is
a sign that this process has failed, as offenders who experience
punishment relapse into crime. Here, the dilemma is that of
the “stick versus carrot”, a dilemma that has already received
ample attention within evolutionary public goods game [39],
the main focus being on punishment [40]. On the other hand,
recent research on antisocial punishment has raised concerns
on the use of sanctions as a means to promote collaborative
efforts and to raise social welfare [42, 125].
While the majority of previous studies addressing the “stick
versus carrot” dilemma concluded that peer punishment is
more effective than reward in sustaining cooperation [39, 40],
evidence suggesting that rewards may be as effective as peer
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punishment and lead to higher total earnings without poten-
tial damage to reputation [126] or fear from retaliation [41]
is mounting rapidly. Moreover, in their recent paper [44],
Rand and Nowak provide firm evidence that antisocial pun-
ishment renders the concept of sanctioning ineffective, and
argue further that healthy levels of cooperation are likelier
to be achieved through less destructive means. Regardless
of whether the burden of cooperation promotion is placed on
peer punishment [127–129] or reward [43, 45, 130], the prob-
lem with both actions is that they are costly. Cooperators
who abstain from either punishing or rewarding therefore be-
come “second-order free-riders”, and they can seriously chal-
lenge the success of sanctioning [82, 131] as well as rewarding
[130]. In the context of rehabilitating criminals, the question
is how much punishment for the crime and how much reward
for eschewing wrongdoing in the future is in order for optimal
results, as well as whether these efforts should be placed on
individuals or institutions [132–134], and assuming of course
the resources are limited [135, 136].
Berenji et al. [38] have introduced an evolutionary game to
study the effects of “carrot and stick” intervention programs
on criminal recidivism. The model assumes that each player
may commit crimes and may be arrested after a criminal of-
fense. In the case of a conviction, a criminal is punished
and later given resources for rehabilitation, in order to pre-
vent recidivism. After their release into society, players may
choose to continue committing crimes or to become paladins
(P ), implying they have been permanently reformed. Players
are given r chances to become paladins; if after the r-th arrest
and rehabilitation phase, an individual relapses into crime, he
or she is marked as an ureformable (U ). States P and U are
thus sinks, meaning they represent the end of the evolutionary
process for each particular individual. As such the final P/U
ratio is a natural order parameter of the system: crime-infested
societies are marked by P/U → 0 and crime-free societies
by P/U → ∞. The main parameters of the game are the
allocated resources for rehabilitation h, the duration of the re-
habilitation intervention τ , and the severity of punishment θ,
The parametrization of the game requires that for each player
a record is kept for the number of punished and unpunished
crimes. Stochastic simulations are performed which include
the constraint hτ + θ = C, where C is the total amount of
available resources. Here hτ is the portion of the resources
spent on rehabilitation efforts – the carrots – while θ is the
remainder, spent on punishment efforts – the sticks. Because
C is finite, increasing one effort decreases the other, hence
the “stick versus carrot” dilemma. For a given set of resource
allocation h, τ, θ, we use the P/U ratio as a measure of suc-
cess. Figure 11 shows that as C increases, the ratio P/U will
increase as well: with more general resources available, the
conversion to paladins becomes more efficient. For a given
value of C Fig. 11 also shows that the most successful strat-
egy in reducing crime, warranting the highest P/U ratio, is
to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished,
criminals experience impactful intervention programs, espe-
cially during the first stages of their return to society. Indeed,
the upper right panel of Fig. 11 reveals that for the case of
N = 400 players the optimal parameter values are h = 0.3,
τ = 1.5 and θ = 0.35. This indicates that the available re-
sources C need to be balanced so that there is enough stick
(a sufficiently high θ) and enough carrots (a sufficiently high
h) for a long enough time (a sufficiently high τ ). Within this
model, excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less ef-
fective than the judicious balancing of the two. In the first
case, there are not enough resources for rehabilitation left,
in the second, punishment was not strong enough to discour-
age criminals from committing further crimes upon release to
society. These findings have important sociological implica-
tions, and they provide clear guidance on how to minimize
recidivism while maximizing social reintegration of criminal
offenders.
VII. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
As we hope this review shows, the statistical physics of
crime can provide useful insights into the emergence of crim-
inal behavior, as well as suggest effective policies towards
crime abatement. The mathematical model for crime hotspots
reviewed in Section II, for example, provides a mechanis-
tic explanation for recent difficulties in observing crime dis-
placement in experimental field tests of hotspot policing. The
model also forms the basis for a better understanding of why
and how crime hotspots form and propagate through time and
space. Moreover, the position of the criminals and the bias-
ing attractiveness field create nonlinear feedback loops, which
give rise to complex patterns of aggregation that are reminis-
cent of actual crime hotspots.
In Section III, we reviewed how the highly space-time clus-
tered nature of certain types of crime, akin to earthquakes and
their aftershocks, can be exploited by means of self-exciting
point process modeling. Methods developed in the realm of
self-exciting point processes are well suited for criminologi-
cal applications, and they have been applied successfully for
gaining insight into the form of space-time triggering and tem-
poral trends in urban crime, for geographical profiling of crim-
inal behavior, as well as for modeling the temporal dynamics
of violence in Iraq.
If crime is treated as a social dilemma, as reviewed in Sec-
tion IV, evolutionary dynamics reveals that informants are key
to the emergence of a crime-free society. Furthermore, even
a crime-dominated society can be transitioned to one that is
largely crime-free by introducing an optimal number of in-
formants. Since resources for their recruitment may be lim-
ited, an optimal control problem can be designed to find the
most favorable informant recruitment strategies under differ-
ent constraints. Human experiments fully confirm that infor-
mants are vital in diminishing crime, in fact even more so than
predicted by the accompanying theory. Another evolution-
ary game designed to study crime, the conceptually simple
three-strategy inspection game, reveals surprisingly nuanced
and rich outcomes, including recurrent behaviors when there
are gains associated with committing crimes. The complex
dynamics that emerges from both games highlight that crime
may be only partially understood by assuming that particu-
lar individuals are marked by a “criminal nature”. Rather one
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should look at the overall social context and conditions that
seem to promote criminal behavior.
In Section V we reviewed a recent study on cannabis pro-
duction networks in the Netherlands, showing that all possi-
ble attempts at network disruption did not weaken the network
as desired, but rather made it more resilient. This highlights
the difficulties of policymakers and law enforcement agencies
across the globe to find effective strategies to control and ef-
ficiently dismantle criminal networks. We have also reviewed
two distinct attempts to identify criminal and gang networks
using field and/or gang rivalry data, geographical informa-
tion, social interactions and behavioral patterns. Both meth-
ods were successful in reconstructing known crime networks
and gang clustering, showing how these case studies can be
applied to situations where actual gang or network structures
are not known and as possible guidance when intervening in
trying to detect the source of crime. A more mathematical ap-
proach was used to model gang aggregation and territory for-
mation by means of an Hamiltonian, Potts-like model, where
interactions among agents were expressed via indirect graf-
fiti markings. The analysis reveals that first and second order
phase transitions from coexisting, well mixed gangs towards
networked, geographically segregated gang clusters are pos-
sible even in the absence of direct gang-to-gang interactions.
Under certain conditions, the indirect coupling provided by
graffiti marking is thus sufficient to nucleate exclusive gang
turfs.
Lastly, in Section VI, we focused on rehabilitation and re-
cidivism as modeled via a “stick versus carrot” evolutionary
game. Given that total resources are finite, an important ques-
tion to address is how much punishment for the crime and how
much rehabilitation efforts after the punishment phase are in
order to obtain optimal results. The reviewed research shows
that the most successful strategy is a judicious resource allo-
cation between the carrot and the stick, so that after sufficient
punishment, criminals also experience impactful intervention
programs. This is true especially during the first stages of a
criminal’s return to society. Excessively harsh punishments
accompanied by too little rehabilitation, as well excessively
lenient punishments appear to be not quite as effective in re-
ducing the recidivism rate.
Extensions of approaches reviewed in Sections II-VI may
be useful to police and other security agencies in develop-
ing better and more cost-effective crime mitigation schemes
while optimizing the use of their limited resources. The sta-
tistical physics of crime is still a very much developing and
vibrant field, with ample opportunities for novel discoveries
and improvements of existing models and theory. The model
of crime hotspots, for example, could be easily upgraded to
account for the distribution of real estate that better reflects
the layout of an actual city. It would then be interesting to
learn whether and how the introduced heterogeneity in the
interaction network affects the emergence and diffusion of
hotspots. If the crime is no longer residential burglary but
crime that involves moving targets, further extensions towards
social networks whose structure varies over time also become
viable, and they point to a whole new class of coevolutionary
crime models. If crime is treated as an evolutionary game the
possibilities are even more, ranging from increased strategic
complexity to the integration of more realistic, possibly coe-
volving, interaction networks that describe the societal fabric.
In the realm of adversarial evolutionary games, it would also
be interesting to study the impact of different strategy adop-
tion rules, in particular since imitation-based rules are fre-
quently contested with best-response dynamics in the realm
of human behavior. In addition to the outlined extensions and
upgrades of existing models, it is also possible to envisage
new classes of models, especially such that would built more
on self-organization and growth from first principles to even-
tually arrive at model societies with varying levels of crime.
Here the hierarchical growth of criminal networks involving
persuasion to join an organization and fidelity to either com-
mitting or not committing crimes appears to be a viable start-
ing ground.
Informed by the reviewed research, we conclude that the
statistical physics of crime clearly has far-reaching sociolog-
ical implications, and we emphasize that the time is ripe for
these insights to be used in synergy with traditional crime-
related research to yield more effective crime mitigation poli-
cies. Many examples of ineffective policies clearly highlight
that an insufficient understanding of the complex dynamical
interactions underlying criminal activity may cause strong ad-
verse effects of well-intended deterrence strategies. A new
way of thinking, maybe even a new kind of science for deter-
ring crime is thus needed – in particular one that takes into
account not just the obvious and similarly linear relations be-
tween various factors, but one that also looks particularly at
the interdependence and interactions of each individual and
its social environment. One then finds that this gives rise to
strongly counterintuitive results that can only be understood
as the outcome of emergent, collective dynamics, and this is
why applied mathematics and methods of statistical physics
can make important and substantial contributions to the un-
derstanding and containment of crime. We reiterate that the
aim of this short review was to highlight these valuable theo-
retical resources that can help us bridge the widening gap be-
tween data and models of criminal activity, and we hope that
the outlined directions for future research will further acceler-
ate progress along this beautiful and highly applicable avenue
of research.
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